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Using Metaphor in Legal Analysis
and Communication
A Symposium of the
Mercer Law Review
Friday, November 10, 2006
Question and Answer Period
PROFESSOR RITCHIE: We have left some time this afternoon for
people to ask questions of any of our panelists. If you do have questions,
please identify which person you would like to answer your question.
AUDIENCE: I would particularly direct my question to Professor
Smith, but also ask all of the panelists to respond. Is there such a thing
as a separate category for metaphors that are purely stylistic as opposed
to metaphors that would also fit in some of the other categories that
Professor Smith has identified? It seems to me that all metaphors are
more than stylistic, and that the examples in category, is it four,
Professor Smith, that you have identified are, in fact, doing meaning
making for us? They happen to be lovely stylistic devices as well, but
they are, in fact, constraining, structuring our thought about those
topics.
PROFESSOR SMITH: It may have been a poor choice of words to call
it stylistic because in my presentation I tried to allude to the fact that
they are serving many functions. They are serving a logos function, or
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a logic function, by providing an analogy. They serve ethos functions by
establishing credibility on behalf of the writer. They are serving pathos
functions by evoking substantive emotion, as well as emotion about the
writing. And, so, I only mean it is stylistic in the sense that it did not
exist before the writer wrote it as opposed to doctrinal metaphors, which
may start out as stylistic metaphors but have been adopted as the rule
for that area.
I think absolutely metaphors make meaning. The only difference
between, for example, a doctrinal metaphor is someone made that
meaning previously and now it is being used as the rule that lawyers are
asked to argue under. And a stylistic metaphor can become a doctrinal
metaphor if the court agrees with that metaphor and decides that it is
going to empower the metaphor with the power of the state and make
that the rule that attorneys are going to argue under. So, by stylistic,
I do not mean merely stylistic. I meant creative.
Professor Winter pointed out to me that some of the examples were
not necessarily original to those authors, but someone originated them;
and, so, it may be a problem with the examples, not the problem with
the concept. I know in my advanced persuasion class my students have
to create original metaphors in a piece of persuasive writing. And, so,
what I mean by that category is not arguing within an existing
metaphor, but being the one who creates that connection between two
dissimilar things and offering it up as a metaphor to serve all the
functions that are served. But unless the court adopts the metaphor as
a representation of a doctrinal rule, it is not a doctrinal metaphor. It
was more of a rhetorical device that was used by an advocate that could
become a doctrinal metaphor.
PROFESSOR WINTER: The great comedian Lenny Bruce said, "I'm
not original. The only guy who is original is the guy who invented the
English language." I think Wittgenstein made the same point about the
impossibility of a private language.
There probably is no such thing as an original metaphor because, if
there really were, you would not understand it. It has to refer to
something you understand for it to work. As Stanley Fish says: "The
gun at your head is your head." The thing that is compelling would not
be compelling unless there were something inside you that experienced
it as compelling. I will just give you one example. I mean they are all
great metaphors, and I think they are creative. But I would not call
them original. This one I think was the last one of Michael's examples:
"Each oppressive practice is one wire in a birdcage." It comes from an
article that talks about equality. I presume it is an article about
equality. But that is a reference to a metaphor we all know. It is very
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conventional, the "bird in the gilded cage" metaphor. It is an important
metaphor in feminist theory: that you can be imprisoned by nice, by
good treatment, as well as by bad. I mean that is part of the power of
that metaphor, even that phrase. It refers to another metaphor that is
antecedent and carries a lot with it.
Part of what I was trying to show with the marketplace of ideas
metaphor is that it works precisely because it is not free form. It is
referring to and drawing together things, understandings, that you
already have.
So, I think the short answer to your question is, yes, I agree with the
premise of your question. I think that, from a practical standpoint-and
given the tenor of my talk and most of my work, you probably do not
think of me as a practical person; but I was a practicing lawyer for
almost ten years and I tried a lot of cases-the important points are, and
these have been made by others on the panel, the role that these devices
can play in persuasion, in getting the decisionmaker, whether it is the
jury or the judge, to think about the case in a way that you want.
I think that the most powerful are framing effects, which you can do
lots of ways. First, a metaphor can be used to build a frame. Second,
a story can be used. A frontier metaphor can be used to build a frame
that already starts you thinking about things in certain terms. Good
rhetoricians know this. Almost any Stanley Fish piece will have them.
I do not know why I am talking about Stanley Fish so much today. One
of the reasons is because he is brilliant. I have learned a lot from him.
When I wrote an article criticizing Stanley Fish, I did Fish to him.
You tell a story first that seems to have nothing to do with what you're
talking about. He starts an article about jurisprudence with a story
about baseball in Dennis Martinez and The Uses of Theory. But the
point is that his point is already in the story. The story has already
created a schema for thinking about the point he is trying to make and
he already has your brain processing things and filing them, to use an
incorrect but conventional metaphor, in precisely the space he wants.
I will give you one concrete story. The most brilliant brief I ever
read-and it was not by me-was written by Jay Topkis who was a
partner at the Paul Weiss litigation firm in New York. This was back
when I was at the Legal Defense Fund, where I worked for many years.
There was a point in the late 1970s when the NAACP sued the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund to get their name back. The NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, as many of you know or may not recognize, was Thurgood
Marshall's organization that argued Brown v. Board of Education. It
goes back to 1939. It was an offshoot of the NAACP, mostly for tax
purposes. But by the late 1970s, I won't go into the political details,
they trademarked the letters NAACP and they sued us for infringement
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of their trademark. We lost in the District Court in D.C. and won in the
D.C. Circuit. And this is how the brief actually started. This is almost
verbatim. "Once upon a time there was a parent and the parent had a
child, and the parent was very proud of the child and gave the child its
name. Then there came a time when the child grew up and exceeded
the parent in wealth and fame and good fortune and deeds, and the
parent got jealous and sued to take its name back."
The case is over at this point, right? It does not matter what the rest
of the facts are. It does not matter what the law is, right? Once you see
the dispute as that kind of internecine warfare, right, unfairly by a
parent against his or her own child, the case is over. But it was
brilliant. So, that is an example of framing by a story.
The third is by using a prototype effect. If you want people to think
about birds, you do not name an Emu, you name a Robin or a Sparrow.
And the same thing is true with legal arguments in legal categories. I
have other war stories, but I will not tell that because I do not want to
dominate the discussion. But by using the right kind of prototype it
makes-and we know this from Rips-it actually activates the entire
category. So, that is another way to build a frame. It works because
there is something already there.
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: You just said what I was going to say-it
is very popular to have what I call the miracle theory of creativity. It
just happens, and there is no explaining it. Some people just do this.
But for the most part, what you are doing concerns something that Mark
Turner and Gilles Fauconnier have argued extensively in their book, The
Way We Think, which is about conceptual blending. They show you a
number of different patterns by which people routinely can create
creative conceptual blends. And you do make use of these cognitive
resources you have. I want to urge that it is not that you can predict
when something creative will come about, but it is an appropriation of
something and seeing how it, or some certain structures, can apply to
some other domain.
That is not an explanation of how to be creative, but at least it
suggests that it's not a miracle. It is not this act is, like Richard Rorty
would say, just a radical rupture. I mean we move from one language
game or one vocabulary to another. No, it is done with something that
was there before. And if it didn't, it, as you started your comment with,
it would not make sense to us. It would be so alien, it would truly be
infinitely other, but it's not. We can relate to it.
PROFESSOR WINTER: I just want to say one thing about enhancing
creativity because I think it is particularly apt for law students. There
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was a time when to be a good lawyer, you had to know history, and you
had to know literature. In the nineteenth century, great lawyers were
generalists. I think one of the costs of a conventional legal education is
it focuses in exactly the wrong direction: We're going to define things
more and more precisely, a more and more narrow focus. A part of being
creative as lawyers is learning to see the connections across things that
should not be connected. For me, the eye opener was when I was a first
year student. One of my friends in the upper class and I were talking
about what courses I should take, and I said, "I guess I'll take corporations. It seems to me that I should take that, but I understand it's a
hard course." He said, "It's an easy course. Corporations is just torts all
over again." I thought he was a little nuts at the time. But then I took
corporations and, damn, if he wasn't right. It is just another version of
the reasonable man standard, right? Half the course was 10(b)(5). He
was absolutely right. That taught me a very important lesson. You
learn the separate doctrinal areas but then start to see that they are
really all the same. I think there are only about seven moves, and the
law just repeats them infinitely in different ways. There is the balancing
test and the multi-factor test which are basically the same. There is
means-ends analysis and objective versus subjective. There is really
only a handful of them, and they just repeat endlessly. So, seeing those
connections and looking for those connections rather than thinking that
torts has to be different than corporations or contracts, suddenly you can
start to draw those cross-domains connections within the law.
Of course, the same is true outside law. So the other thing is: Read
broadly. It is very hard. I started The Brothers Karamazov at the
beginning of law school, and I finished it four years later. It is hard to
read when you are in law school, but read more broadly because it's in
the interconnections that the creativity happens. If you create the
opportunities for your brain to draw connections, you will make more
connections and do more interesting, creative and persuasive work.
PROFESSOR SMITH: The creativity in creating an original metaphor
is not creating both sides of the equation but creating that connection
and expressing that connection.
PROFESSOR RITCHIE: Any more questions?
PROFESSOR WINTER: Actually, I want to get this on the table.
Most of what Michael and Linda said I absolutely agree with, and much
of it strongly. But there's one thing: There is a problem when you talk
about these things in terms of the old categories of truth and style, and
that is probably what I think created some of the problem. So, this is
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not by way of disagreeing with Linda at all, but just to point something
out which I think is important to the students particularly. The little
mnemonic about the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truthmetaphor tells more than the truth. If you think about it, rules are
worse. Rules don't tell the truth; they don't tell the whole truth; and
they certainly don't tell nothing but the truth. So, any rule is... one
of the problems is when you contrast an old strategy of attacking a
metaphor, the Cardozo strategy, it presupposes there's some other truth
outside the metaphor. But the point of the earlier examples is that
there are no other truths. There's not some truth of planethood. That
was Plato's idea. There are ways we understand things, and we
understand things for purposes. And, so, the whole discourse of truth
is problematic.
Take just about any rule. But, for example, one of my favorites is, "No
animals on the bus." It's a lie, right? It can't be true because I can get
on the bus, right? I am an animal. Maybe a rational animal, at least
I like to think I am rational. But we are all mammals, right? And by
the same token, no one thinks that it would apply to paramecia, which
are single-cell organisms that I studied in high school, which are
technically animals. Nobody thinks the rule is about that, right? And
you can pick any rule. No vehicles in the park. It doesn't matter what
it is; any rule is going to be that way because the categories at that high
level of abstraction are too broad to deal with the real meanings. So, the
rule tells more untruth than any metaphor or metonymy. Which isn't
to say that the metaphor is always better. It is just simply to say that
truth is not what we presuppose. We are presupposing that rules could
be literal and propositional and say precisely what they mean, and that
is not true even for propositional rules.
PROFESSOR BERGER: I want to respond because the only reason
I used it is because I think it makes a nice distinction between the two
things. But I also think that the problem is that when you use
metaphor and metonymy in this surface way, it obscures any ability to
get below what is there because all the baggage that goes along with the
metaphor is accepted; whereas, if I actually said to you this is a
statement of the truth, you could challenge it. But with the metaphor,
you don't even know what I am taking along.
PROFESSOR WINTER: I don't know. The facts could challenge it.
PROFESSOR BERGER: You could at least have an argument about
it. With the metaphor you don't even have the argument.
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PROFESSOR WINTER: Sure I can. I can say that is a bad metaphor
because it picks out these things which do not really apply.
PROFESSOR BERGER: To do that, you must first recognize the
metaphor.
PROFESSOR WINTER: Yes, but the same could be said about the
propositional statement.
PROFESSOR BERGER: But, back to your original point, I am not in
favor of "the" truth. Let me just go on the record, I am against the
concept that "the" truth is out there waiting to be discovered.
PROFESSOR WINTER: So, we agree actually more than we disagree.
PROFESSOR BERGER: We do.
PROFESSOR WINTER: I think it is about unpacking it. Because
people make the same argument about narrative as a mode of legal
argument. They attack people like Patricia Williams. You tell a
narrative about being excluded from a store and how can I attack it, it
is just a statement? But that is not true. You can ask all sorts of things
about it, unpack the story: What are the assumptions that it makes?
What are the normative points that it is including? And the truth is we
tend to do that more with stories and let people like Ronald Dworkin get
away with much worse stuff, right? They make assertions and nobody
asks them to unpack it. And their assertions are much less reality
grounded.
PROFESSOR SMITH: If we take as an assumption that rules cannot
reflect the truth, the ultimate truth, from the standpoint from an
advocate, the desire to attack a metaphor, a rule expressed as a
metaphor, is not necessarily to replace it with the truth but to replace
it with a more favorable rule.
PROFESSOR WINTER: Right. I'm just saying the rule form, which
is not necessarily metaphorical isn't more accurate PROFESSOR SMITH: -

with a more favorable metaphor.

PROFESSOR RITCHIE: I think Michael Goldberg wants to get in on
this.
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PROFESSOR GOLDBERG: Yes. I guess, I mean except at the trivial
level, there is the old Aquinas thing, there is no such thing as the truth,
do you hold that statement to be true, so it is a self-refuting statement
and that does not get you very far. But I think it is really important in
law school not to train students to be nihilists, that there is no such
thing out there except however you want to argue. By the way, the
argument itself is something that is free of context. So, I hope you at
least somewhere in your reptilian brains get that. And there we go with
the metaphor.
The other thing I want to say is I have to ask a question about what
is a category mistake. See, I think you made one. Dumb ass is not a
metonym.
PROFESSOR BERGER: A metonym?
PROFESSOR GOLDBERG: Yes, a metonym. Thank you. I was going
to do PROFESSOR BERGER: Ass would be though.
PROFESSOR GOLDBERG: Yes. But dumb ass, that is exactly it.
Dumb ass isn't. But on the other hand, what I want to ask is, and I'll
ask Mark this since this is his stuff. What does a category mistake look
like in the theory that you've developed? Is there such a thing?
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: It is sort of what Steve was saying earlier.
What is categorization? It is a way of making discrimination; we are
discriminatory animals. If we didn't discriminate, we would be dead.
Categories are ways of cutting what is a process, a flow of experience.
And how do we cut or how do we select? We select relative to our
interests, our values, our goals, our history. And, so, these categories
are always relative-like whether Pluto is a planet. It's relative to
practices, narratives, histories; and, so, what constitutes a category
mistake depends upon what values you have.
PROFESSOR GOLDBERG: I agree. It is fact uncontextualized. But
let me give you this: I like the way you guys do stuff because I find it
as wit. Law review articles are interesting. The stuff that I used to
read in religious studies, in philosophy, just bored the hell out of me.
So, I want to say how much I admire what you do.
Did you hear about the Templeton experiment? Templeton has
mutual funds and makes a lot of money, I guess, that's a good thing.
But he uses this to show the relationships between science and religion.

20071

QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

1029

He funded an experiment at the Harvard Medical School, which is
interesting about what medical researchers on what medical schools will
take to do their funding, on whether people who pray for other people
would get better. And the fact is some of them got worse. This is a
category mistake. It makes the point that prayer works like a physical
cause instead of what it is generally associated as, some kind of
petitionary reason.
So, when we argue here, it would be a mistake for someone to say,
you've come over to my position. I caused you to do that. I mean in a
sense I've given you reasons. So, this is what I am trying to get at with
metaphor. I mean does anything go? So, the Templeton guys, well, they
blew five hundred thousand dollars on an idiotic experiment.
PROFESSOR WINTER: I actually have two responses. They are
related, and it won't take too long to tie them together nicely. I do not
think it is the case that any metaphor goes. There are category
mistakes, although not to the degree or as many as is consistent with
the practice of professional philosophical argument where there are
category mistakes everywhere. But that is because they are using
relatively rigid categories that get smaller and smaller. So, Mark's point
remains true. Category mistakes are relative to the categories and the
values and the purposes we hold.
If my purpose is to survive, right, and my categories are things that
will kill me and things that won't harm me, and if I think sticking my
finger in a socket is an okay thing, that is going to be a category
mistake, right? That is an easy choice. But Pluto is not on that order,
right? Okay.
PROFESSOR GOLDBERG: Right.
PROFESSOR WINTER:
So, the answer is, Mark's answer is
absolutely correct. It is relative to the categories and the values we
hold. And for certain kinds of categories there can be obvious category
mistakes. For metaphors, there are better and worse ones. You know,
one of my critical legal studies colleagues at a former institution, we had
this argument because the CLS assumption is that everything is
indeterminate, you know. Take, and this was his example, "life is like
a pencil." It's not a very good metaphor. I could work at it and make
some sense out of it. It has a point, it has an eraser, right? The eraser
is like, I wish, I did lots of things I could erase. But life is not like a
pencil.
So, it is not the case that any metaphor is going to work. Because
metaphors have entailments, they obscure some things, they carry over
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others. The mappings ought to be equally good, right, which is separate
from being equally persuasive.
So, no, I mean that is the lead-in back to the nihilism point. First of
all, it is not nihilistic. But, really, on the nihilism and truth question,
on that I think I stand with Nietzsche. Nietzsche made the point.
Nietzsche has not been really understood well except by a few scholars.
But Nietzsche's point was it is the belief in truth that is nihilistic. It is
the belief in truth external to us as human beings that denies the
meaning making that humans do. And what's more nihilistic than that?
That's a profound point. I mean, to say it another way and in a
simpler way is to say if you believe there is a truth out there, and it
turns out that there isn't, and if you need God for truth and it turns out
there isn't God, and if you need Plato's ideal forms and the forms don't
exist, then that is what gives you nihilism because then you're left with
nothing. But I think cognitive science proves that it is more profound
than that. Cognitive science shows that truth and meaning are things
that we as human beings make, both as embodied human beings and as
human beings as a community. To put truth "out there" is to deny the
truths that we really have.
I mean we have science and medicine. And they do wonderful things,
not because they are objective truths but because they are things that
were developed by human beings over centuries through lots of error.
We wouldn't have those truths but for the kinds of human processes that
are very much like the case of Pluto. There was a long debate for a
while whether AIDS was caused by a retrovirus or something else, right?
For a long time, because of the way the community was constructed,
they were looking at the wrong thing. But it is about the human
processes and practices that create these truths, and some of these
truths are marvelous ones. That doesn't make them any less true. They
are not any less true because we made them.
PROFESSOR RITCHIE: Another question?
AUDIENCE: Okay. I am for truth, but I guess I want to postulate
that the fact that we cannot accurately capture it or characterize it and
the fact that we cannot come up with a metaphor that is big enough to
include it all, or that does not get it wrong in some way does not tell us
anything about whether there is, in fact, truth out there. Those are
really different questions it seems to me, and that, therefore, we can do
better sometimes, or worse sometimes, at glimpsing what truth is, and
we can never really know for sure. But the fact that we, as human
beings with language and other forms of perception cannot, if there are
other forms of perception, cannot get at it does not mean that it is not
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there. And, so, I guess I want to take Professor Johnson's point and
maybe change it a little bit, and he will probably disavow it now because
I have done something inaccurate to it, but he said that where do our
values come from? The fact that if they do not come down from above
that they come from, the instantiated in us, they are embodied within
US.
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: Our relationship to environments.
AUDIENCE: Precisely; yes. That does not deflate them you said.
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: No.
AUDIENCE: In fact, it shows how beautiful they are. I think I would
say that the fact that we cannot capture truth by any one metaphor or
any series of metaphors, and that we cannot get it quite right ever really
does not disavow truth's existence but simply shows us how beautiful it
is.
PROFESSOR JOHNSON: You know what I am going to say. First
off, which metaphor for truth do you mean? There is truth as correspondence, there is the coherence theory of truth, there is the pragmatist's
view of truth, and one of the most robust developments in the history of
Western philosophy over the past two hundred years has been a
sustained critique of the correspondence theory of truth from a number
of different perspectives. The idea that there is truth out there and
independent of us and we come to discover it, I think, has been shown,
by many traditions, phenomenologists, analytic philosophers, pragmatist
philosophers, to be founded on a set of assumptions which do not hold
up under scrutiny, so I will not get in that argument. But it (i.e., the
idea of truth "out there") does not follow. I mean as Steve said, if you
make claims; for example, what if you think you are a utilitarian and
you think that we can calculate the good that will accrue in a situation.
It turns out that is just empirically not correct. Human beings do not
work that way. The mind does not work that way. And there are lots
of both empirical and more straightforward and philosophical arguments
against that. There are concrete consequences in terms of what
metaphors we take, but I would deny that there is something called the
truth that is out there, and we need to rethink that notion. And it does
not follow, that does not lead you to a kind of disgusting cultural
relativism.
I want to say one more thing which is when you start looking at
metaphors, say, for human flourishing, there aren't two hundred of
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them, there aren't even twenty of them. Around the world you keep
seeing these patterns through human history of things that have been
taken to be valuable. And a certain set of metaphors grow up around
them, and then they get articulated in these complex narratives in terms
of which we get our sense of what virtue is, of what the good life is, of
what it means to be a human being and of what dignity is. I mean, and
I think you illustrated that.
So, I am not a fan of The Truth. I think that is a hypostatization of
something, and I would see truth as having to do with our engagement
in the world and what sorts of entailments there are and do they
actually, how do they cash out? But they cash out relative to what, some
values we happen to have, and we can never get around, I don't think
you can ever get away from that. And you're going to say, well, those
are the absolute values. Well, relative to what?
PROFESSOR RITCHIE: Any other questions? Okay. I have a few
remarks, and I will go through them quickly. At the beginning of the
sessions today, I asked this question: "Are metaphors really just literary
devices, or are they something more profound?" I am not sure we
actually answered that question, but we made a significant start. Maybe
we will never answer it, but at least the question has been raised in
your mind.
There are undoubtedly reasons why people like Lord Mansfield and
Benjamin Cardozo were suspicious of metaphors. These reasons,
however, I believe relate to a fixed and reductive notion of mind and
reasoning. That is what Mark Johnson was just talking about.
Today our panelists have suggested that such a notion of mind and
reasoning is inadequate to account for how we think. Applied to legal
reasoning, this more robust conception of human thought means that we,
as lawyers and law students, utilize complex cognitive and embodied
processes when we think through legal problems. Our panelists have
further suggested that one of these fundamental processes is the use of
metaphor.
Metaphor, then, is not merely a device of rhetoric or literary acumen
but is instead a fundamental aspect of our legal analysis and communication. As Mark Johnson put it earlier today, metaphors are necessary
Steve Winter then took that and further
to our understanding.
developed this notion, showing how the fundamental concepts we use to
understand law-concepts that literally, not metaphorically, embody the
law-are conceived of and employed by us in metaphorical terms. His
discussions of the metaphors used in the stream of commerce and the
free speech cases (which were picked up by Professor Berger later on)
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amply illustrate, I think, how pervasive and fundamental cognitive
metaphors are to our understanding of the law.
You might go so far as to say that our conception of law is rooted in
the cognitive processes of metaphoric reason. In this view, law and legal
reasoning is impossible without the use of metaphor. As such, an
accounting of cognitive metaphors, an accounting such as we received
today from our panelists, should help us all better understand how to
engage in the tasks we undertake as professionals in the legal domain.
Michael Smith did a really good job of bringing it home to us in very
practical terms towards the end of today's session.
If this view is correct, and I will refrain from restating the details of
the case made by Professors Johnson and Winter and let you make this
assessment on your own when you read all the papers that are going to
be published in Volume 58 of the Mercer Law Review, we need not
understand the specifics of cognitive science to understand the fundamental role of metaphor in our reasoning. In short, we need not all
become cognitive scientists in order to be good lawyers. We simply need
to employ our faculties of reason, faculties formed by our experiences
(our cultural experiences, our personal experiences, our educational
experiences, and so on). In point of fact, to the best of my knowledge,
none of the people we've discussed here today, Lord Mansfield, Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo, to name the lawyers, were
cognitive scientists. As such, this theory is, as Mark Johnson puts it, a
democratic theory of reasoning available to all of us in our lives and in
our work.
I would like to end by discussing briefly something about the cognitive
theory of metaphor that didn't really come out directly or explicitly this
morning, although it was touched on by Michael Goldberg this afternoon.
That is the idea that how we frame our reasoning in terms of dominant
metaphors has a direct effect on other ways of thinking about concepts.
Pervasive use of certain metaphors has the effect of covering over certain
concepts and concealing them. Lakoff and Johnson recognize, in
Metaphors We Live By, that this move to capture concepts metaphorically, which is admittedly difficult, if not impossible, to check conceals or
covers over other possible conceptions of important ideas. Consequently,
dominant metaphors have a profound effect not only on the experience
in our lives, as both Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida seemed to
recognize, but also on our ability to imagine the possible. Our mental
imagination, then, needs to be just that, imaginative, and I think this
program illustrated this important point many times today.
Law school and legal training can, it is thought, have a negative effect
on imaginations. In fact, I see many of my first year law students
sitting here today, and I am sure that about now you are starting to
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think that this may very well be the case. One of my desires, though,
in helping to put together this program was to illustrate how within the
context of law we can continue to express our mental imagination,
express it in a way that helps us and our clients imagine possibilities,
not close them off. Far from being a stricture on our mental abilities,
law can and should be seen as a perfect example of the art of the
possible. Thanks to Linda Berger for bringing this up in her presentation. Thinking like a lawyer may feel like a constraint. As one of the
students in my advanced writing group told me the other day, there are
some good metaphors that convey how analytically restrictive "thinking
like a lawyer" can be (i.e., law is a suit that fits too tight for informal
situations). Such metaphors probably hit closer to home for some of us.
But this metaphor, the constraint metaphor, covers over the liberating
aspect of how we do what we do. This program and the important and
intriguing ideas expressed by our panelists today should show us how
using metaphor in legal analysis and communication can be, and is,
essential to our identities as thinkers and professionals.
Thank you very much for attending, and thanks again to our panelists.

